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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROTECTION AGAINST ILLEGAL
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v.
Castillo, No. 79-1057 & 79-2358 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 1981).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
held that, in conducting searches for illegal aliens, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) officials need not meet the standard of
probable cause applicable in criminal cases. This holding narrows
considerably the protection against unreasonable searches guaranteed
by the fourth amendment for those individuals suspected of either
being or harboring illegal aliens.
On November 17, 1978, INS agents searched the public and private
areas of Blackie's House of Beef (Blackie's), a Washington, D.C.
restaurant, and found fourteen "illegal" aliens.' The search was con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a federal magistrate, who
prior to issuing the warrant held that the INS had established probable
cause to believe that illegal aliens were on the premises of the res-
taurant.2 The magistrate based this decision on information obtained
by the INS from several sources. In particular, the magistrate con-
sidered (1) affidavits executed in 1976 by two illegal aliens who were
in the custody of the INS in which they stated that, having worked
at Blackie's, they knew of other illegal aliens currently employed
there;3 (2) an affidavit executed by a third party in October, 1978
that made a similar allegation;4 and (3) the sworn statement of an
1. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 8 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981). This case consolidated, on appeal, two district court cases, Blackie's House
of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, No. 78-0787 (D.D.C., filed October 5, 1978), and Blackie's House
of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, No. 78-2338 (D.D.C., filed October 5, 1979). Each case addressed
the validity of a warrant permitting INS agents to search for illegal aliens at Blackie's. The
district court in the first case ruled the warrant invalid because it was issued pursuant to FED.
R. CRIM. P. 41, using the standard form warrant. The district court interpreted Rule 41, as
well as the language of the form warrant used, as authorizing only searches to seize property.
Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 6 (citing
Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, No. 78-0787 (D.D.C., filed October 5, 1978). The
court of appeals upheld the district court's decision, but it did so on the grounds that INS
activity is not criminal law enforcement activity. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo,
Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 34-35. Since the court's opinion in the second case
derails the premises for that first decision, see note 21 and accompanying text infra, and since
the most significant aspects of the court of appeals' opinion concern its treatment of the second
case, this article discusses the facts and rulings in the second case, which was based on an INS
search of Blackie's on November 17, 1978.
The court of appeals interpreted the term "illegal alien" as referring to a foreign national
who enters or remains in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (Supp. Ill
1979). Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 3 n.2.
2. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 8 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981).
3. Id. at 4. While these affidavits were used only to secure the first warrant, one can infer
that the information they contained was relevant to the second warrant.
4. Id. at 7. The court of appeals characterized this affidavit as being "quite specific" since
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INS agent that during a two-day period he had observed numerous
persons of "apparent Hispanic descent" working at Blackie's' and that
Blackie's was a known employer of illegal aliens. 6 The warrant7 di-
rected the INS to enter the restaurant "in order to search for persons
believed to be aliens in the United States without legal authority." 8
Blackie's subsequently filed suit for injunctive, declaratory, and
compensatory relief.9 The plaintiff alleged that the warrant was issued
without the INS having established probable cause as required by the
fourth amendment and that the search, as executed, was disruptive
and beyond all reasonable limits.'o The United States District Court
for the District of Columbia found the warrant invalid, ruling that,
because the warrant failed to describe with particularity each alien
sought, it fell short of the fourth amendment requirement that "no
Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . particularly de-
scribing . . . the persons or things to be seized." "
The issue presented on appeal, then, was whether the warrant
satisfied the fourth amendment probable cause requirement. The court
held that the INS had indeed met the burden established under the
fourth amendment for this particular type of search. 2 The court
it named several suspected illegal aliens, explained how the affiant knew them to be illegal
aliens, and identified where they might be hiding.
5. Id.
6. Id. This assertion was based upon INS records that showed that, since 1974, the INS
had apprehended 48 illegal aliens employed by the restaurant.
7. Unlike the first warrant, this warrant was not a form warrant and FED. R. CrIM. P. 41
was nowhere mentioned. Rather, the authority to search was premised upon 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103,
1357 (1976) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v.
Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 8 (D.C. Cit. July 22, 1981). See notes 14-19
and accompanying text infra.
8. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 8 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981). The warrant limited the INS's search to daylight hours and within ten
days of the order and specified that the area of search included locked rooms. The INS's search
occurred on the day after the issuance of the warrant and began at 11:12 a.m. The agents
searched the public dining area, kitchen and second floor offices of the restaurant. The search
lasted a total of 23 minutes, during which time INS agents observed ten patrons in the
restaurant. Four more patrons entered during the course of the search. Id. at 8-9.
9. Id. at k.
10. Id.; see note 8 supra.
11. Id. at 12 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV). The district court also objected to the
magistrate's failure to indicate, on the face of the warrant, that he had balanced the enforcement
interests of the INS against the privacy interest of Blackie's, its employees, and its patrons.
Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 12 (D.C. Cir.
July 22, 1981).
12. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 11 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981). The court did not address the question of whether the warrant sufficiently
protected the fourth amendment rights of the individuals who were the actual target of the
investigation. See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra. The court, however, did allude
to the existence of such rights. In a footnote, the court refuted the government's position that
Blackie's did not have standing to challenge the entry onto its premises because it was not the
target of the investigation. Id. at 10 n.5. The court cites Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547 (1978), where the Supreme Court flatly rejected the argument that the fourth amendment
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distinguished the particularized description necessary to justify a crim-
inal search warrant from that required in the present case on the
ground that the INS activity leading to the detention of illegal aliens
was not criminal law enforcement activity. " Rather, the court con-
cluded, the appropriate standard of probable cause for INS searches
was that enunciated in Delaware v. Prouse:4 sufficient specificity and
reliability to prevent the exercise of unbridled discretion by law en-
forcement officials. " The court found that the warrant in question,
being as descriptive as was reasonably possible with respect to the
person sought and the place to be searched, did in fact meet the
requirements of Delaware v. Prouse. 16 In addition, the court held that,
overall, the warrant was reasonable, and that, for the purposes of the
fourth amendment, it reflected a fair balance between the right to
individual privacy and the public need for effective enforcement of
immigration laws.
The court began its analysis by noting that the INS derives its
authority to search commercial premises, pursuant to a valid warrant,
from its general statutory authority to investigate possible violations
is less protective of the interests of third parties than of the actual target of an investigation.
Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 10, n.5.
Neither party challenged the proposition that a warrant was necessary to support the INS
search of Blackie's. The court noted that, "in light of Alrneida-Sanchez v,. United States, 431
U.S. 266 (1973), the applicability of the warrant clause of the fourth amendment to INS
enforcement activities can no longer be doubted." Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo,
Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 11.
13. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 14 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981), (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952)). However,
the Supreme Court in Harisiades states only that deportation is a civil rather than a criminal
procedure; it says nothing about activity leading to the detention of illegal aliens. Moreover,
Harisiadr deals only with the deportation of legal immigrants who had become members of
the communist party and not with any violation of the immigration laws. 342 U.S. at 594.
The Blackie's court further argued that "[t]here are no sanctions of any kind, criminal or
otherwise, upon a knowing employer of illegal aliens." Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo,
Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 14. The court overlooked the criminal and other sanctions
which threaten illegal aliens. The first warrant issued by the magistrate authorized the INS
to search Blackie's on the basis that aliens were then "in violation of... Title 8, Section 1325
and Section 24 1(aX2)." 8 U.S.C. § 1325 reads:
Any alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as designated
by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration officers,
or (3) obtains entry to the United States by willfully false or misleading representations
or the willful concealment of a material fact, shall, for the first commission of any such
offenses, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof be punished by im-
prisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than $500, or by both,
and for a subsequent commission of any such offenses shall be guilty of a felony and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by
a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
14. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
15. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 28 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
16. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 30 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981).
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of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Act). 7 The court stated
that the Act reflects Congress's strong interest in effectively enforcing
the immigration laws; that is, it is more than a scheme of normative
prohibitions devoid of any means of enforcement. '- Noting that the
Act itself does not authorize INS entry into dwellings or commercial
premises, the court nevertheless concluded that such searches are
permissable under certain circumstances. 9 This conclusion, it noted,
was supported by Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,2" which held that
a warrantless, random search of an automobile, not qualifying as a
border search, is violative of the fourth amendment except in exigent
circumstances. 2' The court inferred from Almeida that under some
circumstances and after a limited showing of probable cause, the INS
could obtain a warrant to conduct a search of a specific private area
in furtherance of its general statutory powers to question and detain
illegal aliens.22
17. Id. at 15 (citing Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. III
1979)). The Act specifies the requirements for legal immigration into the United States. The
court referred specifically to section 287 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1976):
(a) Any officer or employee of the Service under regulations prescribed by the Attorney
General shall have power without a warrant -
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or
to remain in the United States;
(2) to arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering or attempting to enter
the United States in violation of any law or regulation . . . or to arrest any alien in
the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United
States in violation of any such law or regulation.
Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 17 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981).
18. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 17 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981). To support this assertion, the court pointed to the fact that Congress
never has tried to reduce the INS's powers or to undercut the effectiveness of its enforcement
program. Id. Further, as Supreme Court recognition of the public interest in enforcement of
the immigration laws, the court cited, inter alia, United States v. Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976) (border patrol's routine stopping for questioning of vehicles located on a highway
held to be legitimate exercise of INS powers and not violative of fourth amendment); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 872 (1975) (border patrol may stop vehicles in general
vicinity of border for brief questioning as to residential status). Blackie's House of Beef, Inc.
v. Castillo, Ncs. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 19.
19. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 22 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1976)).
20. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
21. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 21 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981) (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)).
22. This inference appears to be a rather attenuated reading of the Almeida decision. There,
the Supreme Court held that the provision of the Act which authorizes warrantless searches of
vehicles within a reasonable distance from the border, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(aX3), was inapplicable
to an automobile search which occurred 25 miles from the border. Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The power to search which was in question was based upon
explicit statutory language. The Court's decision considered only the extent of that particular
statutory power. The Court nowhere discussed the authority of the INS to obtain warrants to
conduct searches of a type for which the Act does not specifically provide. See Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1)-(3) (1976).
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Having determined that in certain situations the INS is authorized
to search commercial premises pursuant to a valid warrant, the court
characterized such searches as administrative law enforcement activity,
which, according to the Supreme Court decisions in Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc.2' and Camara v. Municipal Court,24 calls for a probable
cause standard more flexible than that required for criminal matters.2'
The court rejected the argument that the Marshall and Camara for-
mulation of probable cause, which departs from the traditional re-
quirement of a particularized description,16 is appropriate only in the
context of routine inspections.27 Instead, where administrative inves-
tigations are involved, the court argued, probable cause may be es-
tablished by specific evidence of an existing violation as well as by
However, it is arguable that the Seventh Circuit implicitly has recognized such authority.
In Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), the court upheld a
preliminary injunction which prohibited INS officials from entering private dwellings occupied
by persons of Mexican ancestry unless the officials possessed a valid warrant to search or arrest.
A search of a private dwelling, although pursuant to a valid warrant, is nonetheless not a search
for which the Act specifically provides.
Also, in United States v. Rodriguez, 532 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit ruled
that, where INS agents lawfully entered a house suspected of housing illegal aliens and found
them there, the agents were justified only in doing the best they could to maintain custody
of the aliens and were not justified in searching the house until a search warrant was obtained.
23. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
24. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
25. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 23 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981) (citing Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), and Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)). In Camara the rule was laid down that "where
consideration of Health and Safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of
'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such
an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken." 387 U.S. at 538 (quoting
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). The Supreme Court
in Camara determined that the ultimate question, for the purposes of adhering to the fourth
amendment, is the reasonableness vel non of a particular warrant. 387 U.S. at 536-37. The
Supreme Court in Marshall, resting on the Camara rule, held that "[a] warrant showing that
a specific business has been chosen for a search [pursuant to the Occupational Health and Safety
Act] on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from
neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries across
a given area, would protect an employer's Fourth Amendment rights." 436 U.S. at 307.
However, the language of the Court's opinions in these cases appears to be limited to the
particular administrative scheme in question and is not necessarily applicable to all searches
deemed to be administrative. This is particularly clear in the Marshall opinion. The Court
stated that "(t]he reasonableness of a warrantless search . . . will depend upon the specific
enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute .. " "In short, we base today's
opinion on the facts and law concerned with [the Occupational Health and Safety Act] and do
not retreat from a holding appropriate to that Statute because of its real or imagined effect on
other, different administrative schemes." Id. at 306. For a discussion of the distinctive char.
acteristics of searches conducted pursuant to the Occupational Health and Safety Act, se
Rothstein, OSHA Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 1979 DuKE L. J. 63, 91.
26. See note 25 supra.
27. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 26 (D.C.
Cir. July 22, 1981).
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a showing of a reasonable legislative or administrative plan requiring
routine searches.2 8 Thus, the Marshall and Camara formulations of
probable cause were found applicable to situations where the INS
seeks a search warrant on the strength of a specific violation of the
Act.29
The court, in addition, stated that a flexible standard of probable
cause was appropriate in this setting because an illegal alien is es-
sentially a "fugitive outside the law," and it is doubtful that his vital
statistics will be on record in the United States or that he will use
his real name.3" Thus, the court reasoned, it would be difficult to
obtain a more particularized description than that provided to the
magistrate in this instance.3 1 The court criticized the district court's
stringent probable cause requirement as having a highly ironic effect;
that is, since the INS could meet the criminal law standard of probable
cause only in the rare instance when an INS informer supplies the
name and description of a specific violator, the INS would be free
to combat isolated cases of illegal immigration but powerless to combat
the more serious problem of illegal alien employees congregating at
a single place.32 The court further noted that, even with a more
particularized warrant, the INS agents' conduct during the search
- the questioning of those employees appearing to be aliens and
found in nonpublic areas of the restaurant - would not have differed.
3
Although the court's opinion arguably protects Blackie's fourth
amendment rights, it fails to consider adequately the fourth amend-
ment rights of the individuals who were the actual object of the
search.34 The court's association of INS searches with other admin-
istrative searches places the suspected illegal alien on a par with the
suspected fire hazard in Camara or the suspected safety violations in
Marshall." Just as the Supreme Court determined in Marshall that
it is reasonable for the purposes of the fourth amendment to subject
businesses to safety inspections based upon less than traditional prob-
28. Id. at 27 (citing Burkhart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313,
1317 (7th Cir. 1980)). As in Marshall and Camara. the ruling in Burkhart also appears to be
limited in its applicability. The Burkhart opinion, which also dealt with Occupational Health
and Safety Act searches, was framed in terms of the particular administrative needs of that Act.
See id. at 1316-19.
29. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, Nos. 79-1057 & 79-2358, slip op. at 27 (D.C.
Cit. July 22, 1981).
30. Id. at 28.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 29.
33. Id. at 28.
34. See note 12 supra.
35. See generally Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Marshall v. Barlow's
Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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able cause, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Blackie's apparently found it reasonable to subject a restaurant owner
to INS searches based upon less than traditional probable cause."
The ruling in United States v. Karathanos37 appears to be more
consistent with the purpose of the fourth amendment. Faced with a
fact situation very similar to that of Blackie's, the court in Karathanos
rejected the notion that the powers granted to the INS by the Im-
migration and Naturalization Act diminish the standard of probable
cause required when a search warrant is sought in connection with
a search for illegal aliens. 38 The court held that the standard of probable
cause necessary to search for illegal aliens is no less rigorous than that
applicable to searches in criminal matters.39 It also rejected any analogy
between INS searches and the type of administrative searches that
were found reasonable in Camara.4"
The court of appeals' holding represents a potential move towards
the narrowing of fourth amendment rights in the area of INS activity.
However, inasmuch as the court did not consider the fourth amend-
ment rights of the individuals who are the actual targets of INS
investigations in reaching its decision, the court's opinion does not
represent a complete analysis of the scope of the fourth amendment
as applied to INS searches.
Stephen James Anaya
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTRICTIONS: EXTRATERRITORIAL
REACH OF UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
STANDARDS - Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has ruled that neither the Atomic Energy Act, as amended
by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, nor the National Environmental
36. In distinghing between warrantless searches of commercial enterprises and the warrantless
INS search of a vehicle 25 miles north of the Mexican border, the Court in Almeida stated that
"businessmen engaged in federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well
as the benefits of the trade, whereas the petitioner here was not engaged in any regulated or
licensed business." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973).
37. 399 F. Supp. 185 (D.C.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 531 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1976). This case
involved an INS search of a restaurant pursuant to a warrant issued on the strength of an
affidavit which was held not sufficient to provide the magistrate with a basis for a finding of
probable cause.
38. Id. at 188.
39. Id.
40. Id.
